Il presente articolo si propone di spiegare il contesto storico-artistico e il significato politico di due esposizioni dell’immediato dopoguerra svolte a Palazzo Venezia, il quartier generale di Mussolini. Esse sono la Mostra dei capolavori della pittura europea (XV-XVII secoli), che ha luogo dall’agosto 1944 al febbraio 1945, e la Mostra d’arte italiana a Palazzo Venezia, inaugurata a maggio e conclusa nell’ottobre 1945. La prima è organizzata e promossa dal Governo Militare Alleato, la seconda dall’Associazione Nazionale per il Restauro dei Monumenti (...) Danneggiati dalla Guerra, fondata e diretta dal filantropo Umberto Zanotti Bianco. Numerose vicende si intrecciano nell’organizzazione di queste esposizioni, tra cui il lavoro dei Monuments Men, le operazioni di salvataggio del patrimonio mobile da parte di alcuni ex funzionari del Ministero dell’Educazione Nazionale, la nascita del Governo Militare Alleato e delle nuove istituzioni italiane antifasciste, la necessità di restaurare il patrimonio artistico distrutto e la fondazione dell’associazione di Zanotti Bianco. Chiunque voglia affrontare lo studio della situazione storico-artistica del dopoguerra romano e nazionale deve necessariamente fare i conti con le due mostre di Palazzo Venezia. (shrink)

Dopo l'affermazione nietzschiana per cui “non ci sono fatti ma solo interpretazioni” la filosofia giunge alla fase del postmoderno, difesa da Gianni Vattimo, in cui dialettica ed ermeneutica rendono “debole” il concetto di verità. Il suo allievo Maurizio Ferraris critica la visone del suo maestro col tentativo di instaurare un nuovo realismo, volendo riportare in auge un concetto di verità, che escluda da esso tutte le verità di tipo epistemologico e religiose. L’analisi e lo studio dell’attacco al postmoderno di Ferraris (...) che qui viene fatto mostra che sia nel pensiero del primo autore, con la difesa delle verità “soggettive”, sia nel secondo, che difende le verità “oggettive”, il concetto di verità resta slegato dalla morale, e che non avendo contenuti epistemologici su cui fondarsi non giunge all’effettivo ritorno di una nozione “forte” di verità. (shrink)

Resumo: Trata-se de um comentário ao texto de santo Agostinho intitulado De fide rerum quae non videntur, na verdade, um sermão motivado pelos equívocos ou mesmo os enganos daqueles que não professavam a fé cristã. Provavelmente o texto foi escrito entre 420-425, tempo propício para fortalecer a fé nas coisas invisíveis, tendo em vista o horizonte que anunciava o declínio do Império Romano. Na composição do texto, em consonância com o estilo próprio de um sermão, são oito breves partes. Sem (...) perder a coesão em torno do tema principal, Agostinho pode concluir que a fé tem olhos próprios capazes de ver - e de nos permitir crer - nas coisas invisíveis.: This article is a commentary on a text of St Augustine entitled De fide rerum quae non videntur, which is a sermon motivated by the misconceptions or even mistakes of those who do not profess the Christian faith. The text was probably written between 420-425 A.D., a time conducive to strengthening of faith in invisible things, given the historical horizon that heralded the decline of the Roman Empire. In the composition of the text, in line with the proper style of a sermon, there are eight brief parts. Without losing cohesion with regard to the main theme, Augustine concludes that faith has its own eyes capable of seeing - and allowing us to believe in - invisible things. (shrink)

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a crise ambiental, a partir do conceito de modernidade e, levando em consideração a preocupação com a natureza, debater as possibilidades de pensar uma ética da responsabilidade que influencie as práticas da ciência e da política. A discussão tomou como referência diversos autores que examinaram a modernidade e sua relação com o contexto da crise, entendida como resultado do caráter experimental na expansão das ciências e das técnicas. Diante disso, as saídas aqui indicadas (...) se direcionam para caminhos diferentes. O primeiro envolve uma posição que implica modificar o conjunto dos elementos que caracterizam o processo de modernização da sociedade. O segundo caminho se insere na mesma estrutura do progresso técnico e científico vigente, modificando somente os valores regulativos. Ambas as possibilidades demonstram a necessidade de considerar que as ações da ciência devem fazer parte das discussões centrais da política, pois se instalam no contexto político de exercício de uma ética em meio à crise ambiental. Nessa perspectiva, faz-se necessária a criação de novos arranjos institucionais para o debate crítico, sob os mais variados riscos produzidos na sociedade.: The purpose of this article is to analyze the environmental crisis in terms of the concept of modernity and, taking into account a concern for nature, discuss an ethics of responsibility that can influence the practices of science and politics. The discussion takes as a reference several authors who have analyzed modernity and its relation to the context of the crisis, which is understood as a result of the experimental character of the expansion of science and techniques. The solutions presented here are directed along different paths. The first involves a position that implies modifying all elements of the modernization of society. The second path fits into the structure of existing technical and scientific progress, but advocates modifying regulative values. Both possibilities demonstrate the need to consider that the actions of science should be part of core policy discussions, as they fall within the political context of the exercise of an ethical position amidst the environmental crisis. It is therefore necessary to create new institutional arrangements for critical debate, under the conditions of the various risks produced in society. (shrink)

As in other Latin American countries, Muslim presence in Argentina traces its origin to Arab migration waves in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century; most of these immigrants came from Lebanon and Syria. We can identify three historical periods; each of these stages involves different degrees of institutionalization, diversification, visibility and negotiation of recognition in the national arena. Currently, Islam is one of the religious options available in a plural religious field and, increasingly, the communities are composed of Muslim (...) Arab descendants and converts. This paper analyze the adhesion to Islam as a dynamic process that includes conversion, tradition, return to religion and intra-Islamic transit among Muslim descendants. Using an ethnographic approach I will examine individual trajectories of converts and Muslim descendants, on the basis of these analyses I will try to establish a critical dialogue with the literature on conversion to Islam. This article also problematizes the converts/Muslim descendants’ dichotomy in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamic of adhesion to Islam. (shrink)

Os textos de crítica literária de Machado de Assis mostram a preocupação do autor com o leitor; mas será em Memórias Póstumas de Brás Cubas que o leitor terá uma participação decisiva na estrutura do romance.Les textes de critique littéraire de Machado de Assis montrent la préoccupation de l'auteur avec le lecteur; mais c'est dans l'oeuvre Memorias Postumas de Brás Cubas que le lecteur aura une participation décisive dans la structure du roman.

Na primeira parte deste trabalho -"Grotesco, literatura, leitor" - discutiu-se o conceito de grotesco, configurado em termos literários, nas suas articulações com a ficcionalidade e a recepção. Na segunda parte - "O leitor e o grotesco em A CAUSA SECRETA" - procedeu-se à leitura do conto machadiano na perspectiva de um texto onde o grotesco, resultado da estruturação do conto, encontra-se configurado em termos ficcionais.A la première partie de ce travail -"Grotesque, littérature, lecteur" - on a discuté le concept de (...) grotesque, configuré en termes littéraires, de pins ses articulations avec la fictionalité et la réception. A la seconde partie - "Le lecteur et le grotesque dans I' "A causa secreta" - on a fait la lecture du comte Machadien au point de une d'un texte ou le grotesque, moyen de la structuration du comte, se trouve configuré en termes fictionels. (shrink)

este trabajo se dividirá en dos puntos: i) exponer las similitudes y las diferencias entre la teoría del materialismo eliminativista de los esposos Churchland y la teoría del funcionalismo de Daniel Dennett con respecto a su conceptualización sobre la concienci; y ii) analizar de manera crítica los planteamientos del materialismo eliminativista y del funcionalismo con respecto a su conceptualización acerca de la conciencia. Además, se sostendrá que en el ámbito de las ciencias cognitivas no existe un consenso, como tampoco una (...) base teórica y conceptual sobre qué es la conciencia. Así mismo, se tendrá en cuenta que, sobre el concepto de conciencia se indaga por la pertinencia del término ―si existe o no―; y de existir: si responde a patrones deterministas o si es un fenómeno ajeno a toda realidad empírica; lo cual lleva, de manera inevitable, a indagar por el debate acerca del libre albedrío. (shrink)

Reseña del libro Ciencia y política en Karl Popper. Más nueve ensayos sobre otros temas de su obra. Blanca Inés Prada Márquez (2018). Windmills Editions. 366 pp.

In the research on literacy learning the concept of language awareness has come forward as a unifying framework for understanding the underlying knowledge that supports ability in reading and writing. Consensus is gathering around the idea that language awareness is an essential foundation. If subsequent work in this area confirms it, this factor may turn out to be the key cognitive-domain explanation for successful literacy learning in school (and for academic purposes in general). In this review we examine two cross-cultural (...) comparisons regarding this claim. The comparisons point to the need to examine cases that juxtapose contrasting conditions. Relevant contrasts place side by side examples that appear to be typical and examples that appear to be exceptional. Taking what appear on the surface as sharply diverging cases, how is access to requisite underlying competencies similar, and how different, from one instance to the other? (shrink)

Was Iris Murdoch a virtue ethicist? At first sight, it would appear that she was not. She does not offer an explicit definition of account of the term ‘virtue’, and there are significant differences between her views and those of standard Aristotelian virtue ethicists. There is no reason, however, to think that the standard Aristotelian view represents the only legitimate form of virtue ethics. In this chapter, I begin by recalling (in section 1) the main commonalities between Murdoch’s criticisms of (...) the prevailing moral theories of her time and those of other first-wave virtue-ethicists. I then highlight (in section 2) some cornerstones of Murdoch’s peculiar approach to morality, which represent the background against which her account of virtue is developed, and I propose to trace these cornerstones back to a more diverse range of influences than the standard version of Aristotelianism. In section 3, I sketch the basics of Murdoch’s account of virtue, and I argue that there are at least three routes to vindicate it as a genuine virtue-ethical approach: the Buddhist, the Kantian and the Socratic-Aristotelian. I explore each of these routes in turn in sections 4, 5, and 6. In conclusion, I argue that the virtue-ethical field would benefit a great deal from the kind of pluralistic account of virtue that Murdoch offers. (shrink)

This paper aims to trace the links between Leopardi’s linguistic reflection and his theory of assuefazione, a theory that focuses on the functions of perception and the imaginative faculty within cognitive mechanisms. This theory also explains the functioning of the modalities with which human knowledge is articulated, starting from the experiential data, and therefore linguistic knowledge, in terms of a metaphorical apperception of the world. Specific attention will also be given to the notion of semantic vagueness, closely linked to the (...) general concept of indefinite: a concept that Leopardi develops in his reflections on the theory of pleasure and which is fundamental to define the peculiarities of the imaginative faculty. Furthermore, through the Garronian study of metaoperativity a more in-depth reading of the leopardian theory of assuefazione and of the link between perception and imagination too, as well as the role these two last faculties play in language will be provided. Precisely the metaoperativity allows us to explain and define with greater clarity the disposizione a poter essere, that is a precondition in order to conceive the Leopardian notion of indefinite. This conceptual clarification will also be important to highlight how the thought of Leopardi – in spite of the asystematicity that characterizes Zibaldone – is structured and deeply coherent, in line with that unitary and global approach to human knowledge of its time: an approach in which linguistic reflection and the theory of knowledge mutually imply each other, tightened by a relationship of mutual relevance. (shrink)

In a time marked by the development of innovative treatments in healthcare and the need for health professionals to deal with resulting ethical dilemmas in clinical practice, this study was developed to determine the influence of the bioethics teaching on the moral competence of medical and nursing students. The authors conduct a longitudinal study using the Moral Competence Test extended version before and after attending the ethics curricular unit, in three nursing schools and three medical schools of Portugal. In this (...) questionnaire the participant is confronted with three ethical dilemmas and asked to evaluate arguments for and against the attitude of the main character. For both nursing and medical students, C-score was lower after the attendance of the ethics curricular units, with a statistically significant decrease in the total score for nursing students and a decrease not statistically significant for medical students. A multivariate analysis did not find any association between this decrease and gender, course, or age. The phenomenon of moral segmentation was observed, with better performance in the worker and judge dilemma, than in the doctor dilemma. These results highlight the need to reflect on the curricular strategies that can be implemented for health professionals to better develop moral competence and decision-making, allowing for the provision of humanized health care. (shrink)

This paper focuses on negative exemplarity-related emotions (NEREs) and on their educational implications. In this paper, we will first argue for the nonexpendability of negative emotions broadly conceived (section 2) by defending their instrumental and intrinsic role in a good and flourishing life. In section 3, we will make the claim more specific by focusing on the narrower domain of NEREs and argue for their moral and educational significance by evaluating whether they fit the arguments provided in the previous section. (...) In section 4, we will propose three educational strategies to foster NEREs’ positive moral role. In conclusion, we will point out that an exemplarist approach to character education would greatly benefit from a more fine-grained account of the emotions involved in the educational process and from a broader perspective on which of these emotions should be taken as valuable for educational purposes. (shrink)

In this paper, we present one of the main starting points of naturalism in ethics: Geach’s challenge against non-cognitivism. We try to find an answer to Geach’s challenge in the notion of family resemblance applied to ethics. In doing so we recover a not much-discussed influence of Moore on Wittgenstein’s conception of family resemblance, which leads us to define Wittgenstein as non-non-cognitivist in ethics. -/- Pre print (some changes in the published edition).

Once upon a time, Aesop says, there was a donkey who wanted to be a pet dog. The pet dog was given many treats by the master and the household servants, and the donkey was envious of him. Hence, the donkey began emulating the pet dog. What happened next? The story ends up with the donkey beaten senseless, chased off to the stables, exhausted and barely alive. Who is to blame for the poor donkey’s unfortunate fate? Well, there could be (...) disagreement upon this, but we think emulation is to blame. And it’s on the kinds of envy-related emulation that we focus in this chapter. More analytically, we aim at vindicating the role of envy for moral exemplars within an exemplarist character educational framework. In the first section, we recall the central tenets of an exemplarist account of moral progress, and highlight how negative emotions, in general, have suffered a bad press within character education, with exemplarism being no exception. Then we provide a brief outline of standard strategies of defending envy by appealing to useful taxonomies of envy (e.g., Taylor 1988; Protasi 2016; Fussi 2018). After that, we put forward our 'Donkey Objection' by recalling Aesop’s fable on "foolish imitation", so as to show that when envy triggers mere emulation, it can bear devastating effects such as conformism and a lack of self-worth and personal integrity. In response to this objection, we bring into play a distinction between two rival forms of imitation—emulation and inspiration—and we coin the label of "inspired envy" for those forms of imitation by inspiration triggered by envy that lead to self-improvement avoiding morally detrimental consequences. (shrink)

The current “exemplarist turn” within virtue ethics is increasingly shedding light on the importance of exemplars both as enabling one to identify the virtues and for the importance they bear for orienting one’s conduct, as well as for educating the novice. However, even if categorizations of exemplars have already been proposed, there seems to be a lack of discussion on the kind of imitation different exemplars are supposed to elicit. In order to offer a preliminary answer to this question, in (...) this paper I present three paths to flourishing via imitation of exemplary individuals: The Platonic, the Stoic, and the Aristotelian. Then, I sketch an attempt to reconcile these models. In conclusion, I suggest that, when it comes to education, this reconciliation becomes necessary. Along these lines, I recommend that a multi-step educational program is elaborated. (shrink)

This paper investigates civility from an Aristotelian perspective and has two objectives. The first is to offer a novel account of this virtue based on Aristotle’s remarks about civic friendship. The proposed account distinguishes two main components of civility—civic benevolence and civil deliberation—and shows how Aristotle’s insights can speak to the needs of our communities today. The notion of civil deliberation is then unpacked into three main dimensions: motivational, inquiry-related, and ethical. The second objective is to illustrate how the post-truth (...) condition—in particular, the spread of misinformation typical of the digital environments we inhabit—obstructs our capacity to cultivate the virtue of civility by impairing every component of civil deliberation. The paper hopes to direct virtue theorists’ attention to the need to foster civic virtues as a means of counteracting the negative aspects of the post-truth age. (shrink)

Faced with current urgent calls for more trust in experts, especially in high impact and politically sensitive domains, such as climate science and COVID-19, the complex and problematic nature of public trust in experts and the need for a more critical approach to the topic are easy to overlook. Scepticism – at least in its Humean mitigated form that encourages independent, questioning attitudes – can prove valuable to democratic governance, but stands in opposition to the cognitive dependency entailed by epistemic (...) trust. In this paper, we investigate the tension between the value of mitigated scepticism – understood as the exercise of reason-based doubt in a particular domain – and the need for trust in experts. We offer four arguments in favour of mitigated scepticism: the argument from loss of intellectual autonomy; the argument from democratic deficit; the argument from the normative failures of science; and the argument from past and current injustices. These arguments highlight the tension between the requirements for trust and justified scepticism about the role of experts. One solution, which we reject, is the idea that reliance, rather than trust, is sufficient for the purposes of accommodating experts in policy matters. The solution we endorse is to create a ‘climate of trust’, where questioning experts and expertise is welcomed, but the epistemic trust necessary for action upon information which the public cannot obtain first-hand is enabled and encouraged through structural, institutional, and justice-based measures. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I argue for an Aristotelian way of accommodating supererogation within virtue ethics by retrieving an account of moral heroism and providing a picture of different degrees of virtue. This, I claim, is the most appropriate virtue-ethical background allowing us to talk about supererogation without falling prey to several dangers. After summarizing the main attempts to deny the compatibility of virtue and supererogation, I will present some recent proposals to accommodate supererogation within virtue ethics. Next, I will argue (...) that these proposals raise substantial worries. I will then offer an analysis of heroism and the degrees of virtue to outline my own alternative definition of supererogation in terms of heroic virtue. (shrink)

In this paper, I will account for the importance of the notion of exemplarity within the contemporary virtue-ethical debate, both in its classic formulation (e.g., Hursthouse 1999) and in the recent exemplarist moral theory advanced by Linda T. Zagzebski (2015; 2017). Despite their differences, which I will discuss extensively, both theories are centered on a characterization of an exemplary virtuous agent that serves as a standard for determining what, in a given situation, is right, wrong, dutiful and forbidden. The first (...) two sections will be devoted to an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches. In the third, I will propose a different role of radical (i.e., exceptional) individuals, i.e., saints and heroes, within a virtue-ethical theory of right action. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Aristotelian phronesis and aims at highlighting its nature as an eye on particulars with general ends in sight. More specifically, it challenges the particularistic interpretation of phronesis and Aristotelian ethics in order to argue for a “qualified generalism.” After sketching a radical Particularistic Reading (PR), the paper defends an interpretation it calls the Priority of Particulars Reading (PPR). First, it shows how PPR effectively accounts for the Aristotelian priority assigned to practical perception while at the same (...) time counterbalancing that priority by means of two interpretive strategies. Then it offers further support to PPR by appealing to its own reading of Aristotle's phronesis. It aims to show that it is possible to defend a legitimate form of PPR without ending in holding PR, and that Aristotle's own theory and work ground the moderate reading. Finally, it draws some implications by analyzing educational practice. (shrink)

Featuring original essays from leading scholars in philosophy and psychology, this volume investigates and rethinks the role of practical wisdom in light of the most recent developments in virtue theory and moral, social and developmental psychology. The concept of phronesis has long held a prominent place in the development of Aristotelian virtue ethics and moral education. However, the nature and development of phronesis is still in need of investigation, especially because of the new insights that in recent years have come (...) from both philosophy and science. The essays in this volume contribute to the debate about practical wisdom by elucidating its role in empirical psychology and advancing important new research questions. They address various topics related to practical wisdom and its development, including honesty, ecocentric phronesis, social cognitive theory, practical wisdom in limited-information contexts, Whole Trait Theory, skill models, the reciprocity of virtue, and challenges from situationism. Practical Wisdom will interest researchers and advanced students working in virtue ethics, moral psychology, and moral education. (shrink)

One of Elizabeth Anscombe’s most decisive legacies is the rejection of modern legalistic morality, in the name of a rescue of Aristotelian-inspired natural normativity. However, as I will argue in this contribution, this legacy does not seem to have been fully collected, neither by those who, like Philippa Foot, are explicitly inspired by Anscombe’s work, nor by those who, while apparently opposing its assumptions, have also somehow recovered it by different routes, as emblematically does Christine Korsgaard in her constitutivist proposal. (...) In more detail, I aim to explore the relationship between teleology and normativity at the crossroads between neo-Aristotelian naturalism and constitutivism: both theories, though opposed, rest normativity on a link between function (the Aristotelian ergon) and practical reason and fail precisely in declining this relationship convincingly. (shrink)

In this paper, I will highlight the role played, within the group of Oxonian philosophers who revived virtue ethics beginning in the 1950s, by perhaps the most heterodox and elusive figure, Iris Murdoch. In particular, I will discuss whether Murdoch can be considered, like Anscombe and Foot, a promoter of virtue ethics, or whether points of contact with that strand are limited to the polemical goals that the philosopher and novelist shared, for a thirty-year period, with her colleagues and friends. (...) Increasingly, important differences have led scholars to treat Murdoch as a heterodox virtue ethicist or as an advocate of an entirely different theoretical framework: from Neo-Platonism, to anti-theory, to a kind of Christian Buddhism or practical mysticism. In this article, I will briefly explore some of these hypotheses and try to show how Murdoch can be seen as the proponent of a credible virtue theory, though certainly far removed from the "mainstream" Aristotelian strand. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that the conception of a virtue in positive psychology is a mishmash of two competing accounts of what virtues are: a Common Sense View and an Aristotelian View. Distinguishing the strengths and weaknesses of these two frameworks leads also to a reconsideration of an old debate, namely, that concerning the Unity of the Virtues thesis. Such thesis is rejected by positive psychologist, as well as by some philosophers among the virtue-ethical field, on the basis, I (...) argue, of a lack of accuracy in defining the very meaning of the concept of what virtues are, before examining the issues at stake. In the first part of the paper, I show to what extent the conceptions of virtue employed by the different voices diverge and the consequences of this divergence for the UV problem. Then, I go on by arguing for one of the two competing accounts, namely, the Aristotelian View, over the other, that is, the Common Sense View. Finally, I show to which of CSV theses positive psychologists are committed, so to explain their rejection of the UV thesis, and to highlight their need for a clearer account of what a virtue is. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the role played by the emotion of admiration in formulating moral judgments. First, I discuss whether and when admiration is a reliable source of moral knowledge, or, on the contrary, it misleads the subject, leaving her prey to forms of uncritical devotion to unworthy objects of admiration. To do so, I try to elucidate which underlying theory of emotions best allows one to characterize admiration as a reliable source of moral knowledge. Second, I introduce the (...) notion of transformative moral experience, understood as a subclass of transformative experiences, and I argue that it is precisely admiration that ensures the rationality of the choices made in such experiences. Finally, in light of this analysis, I show how admiration—together with the constellation of positive and negative emotions connected to the perception of moral exemplarity—acts as a central element for the maintenance of moral integrity. I defend, in particular, the idea that integrity should not be understood as mere coherence, nor as a static maintenance of the moral status quo, but as being firmly rooted in one’s own identity yet open to novelty and especially to the novelty represented by transformative moral experiences. (shrink)

This article sheds light on moral education from an exemplarist perspective. Following Linda Zagzebski's Exemplarist Virtue Theory, we relate several fundamental exemplarist intuitions to the classical virtue ethical debate over the unity-disunity of the virtues, to endorse a pluralistic exemplar-based approach to moral education ("Empe"). After a few preliminary remarks, we argue that Empe amounts to defending "a prima facie" disunitarist perspective in moral theory, which admits both exemplarity in all respects (moral sainthood) and single-domain exemplarity (moral heroism). Then, we (...) evaluate the effectiveness of heroes and saints for moral education, according to four criteria derived from Empe. This analysis allows us to conclude that moral education should value both kinds of exemplars and, therefore, adopt weaker standards of exemplarity than the unitarist's ones. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to single out four main kinds of moralism, which might be associated to virtue ethics, and to offer a virtue-ethical response to each. By doing so, I aim at defending virtue ethics, properly understood, from the intrinsic danger of a moralistic drift. I begin by proposing a definition of moralism and a list of its main forms. Then, I list the main features of the virtue-ethical perspective I embrace, and finally, I argue that such (...) normative approach can prevent a moralistic drift. Thus, I conclude that a virtue-ethical approach, thanks to its capacity of reconciling reasons and motives, and to its proposing an agent-related perspective on morality, has an advantage in presenting moral requirements in a non-moralistic fashion. (shrink)